Deterrence or Compellence ?

Lisbon-Portugal/ December 2000
Afif Safieh


It is normal that the emergence of a new international system should be accompanied by new trends and new schools of thought in the study of international relations. In this respect, the conference organised by the Portuguese Institute for Strategic and International Studies: "Multilateralism in the 21st century" has been most illuminating.
I wish to offer a short reflection on four themes emanating from the state
of affairs in the Middle East:

A) Unwritten alliances: Unfortunately major players in the game of nations decided to inject as little input as possible in the Middle East peace process. This policy of self-inflicted impotence, reduced to facilitating the dialogue and to financing the process, left the negotiating exercise at the mercy of the balance/imbalance of power with the Israeli leadership constantly tempted to dictate rather than negotiate.

Israel enjoys 3 overwhelming military superiorities in the Middle East:

  1.  nuclear monopoly with what ever this might imply;
  2. conventional superiority vis-à-vis any combination or coalition of Arab
    countries;
  3.  an unwritten alliance with the only remaining superpower. For Israel, an
    unwritten alliance is even better than a formal and written alliance. It has
    all the advantages of alliances without the restraint that usually
    accompanies alliances. In an unwritten alliance, the senior partner is not
    accountable for the behavior/misbehavior of the junior partner that can
    pretend to be an "undisciplined ally" with no consequences.


B) Strategic asset or liability?: Israel, in previous decade marketed itself in leading circles as a strategic asset for Western interests, a bastion against possible Soviet expansionism at a moment when the Arab world was ruled by Jamal Abdel Nasser and militant Ba'athism…etc Today the regionalsystem is dominated by profoundly pro-western conservative governments. They all are unreasonably reasonable in their demands and expectations, no more questioning Israel's existence but its 1967 expansion.

Israeli intransigence is today defying, delegitimizing and destabilizing
this pro-western regional system and with public opinion, from Morocco to
Mascat, revolted against what is perceived as American complacency with
Israeli expansionist policies. American perceived inactivity vis-à-vis the
containment of Israel can turn Israel into a liability and burden on American
global and regional interests.

Some hope that a new Republican administration in Washington, more mindful of
the American national interest, will prove to be less docile to Israeli
preferences. For over 5 decades the U.S.A. have given Israel much aid and
occasionally some advice. Israel systematically took the aid and left the
advice aside. The incoming administration will be well -advised to link the
disbursement of the aid with Israeli acceptance of American advice.

C) Deterrence or compellence? Israel constantly invokes the security dimension to explain its policies from claims for territorial rectifications to closures imposed on Palestinian society and economy etc.

The concept of "dissuasion" or "deterrence" is extremely familiar in the study of international relations. It covers the policy of the state-actor in the international system that aims at dissuading and deterring other actors in the system from undertaking actions or adopting policies that might be harmful or detrimental to one's interest or security. I personally believe that another concept -compellence- formulated decades ago by Thomas Schelling helps to better understand Israeli regional policies. Compellence, according to the under-exploited concept of Schelling, is a policy that tends to compel or coerce the environment into adopting policies that suit best one's own interests. Israel's policy towards Lebanon in 1982-83 aiming at satellizing this neighboring state was pure "compellence " that backfired. The way Israel dealt with the Palestinian side, all throughout the years of peace process, aimed at producing a Palestinian entity that would be subordinated to and subjugated by Israel with sovereignty restricted, territorial contiguity prohibited, frontiers with neighboring countries denied,…

D) Democracy and diplomacy: With the approach of the Israeli anticipated elections, Palestinians are constantly advised to accept Barak's proposals because "it is the best offer you will ever get". Such advice usually comes from circles that are resigned to the fact that Israelis can set the ceiling of the possible and the permissible.

Henry Kissinger was known for his pro-Israeli inclinations. Even he was profoundly exasperated by Israeli inflexibility in 1973-74 during his shuttle diplomacy of Middle Eastern capitals. He often complained: "Israel has no foreign policy. Only domestic politics".

In Israel the belief is that peace is a compromise formula half way between Shamir and Sharon, between Labor and Likud, between Barak and Bibi.


I believe we will not have peace in the Middle East until and unless the Israelis are told in the most unequivocal manner that peace is too important to be left to the Israelis to decide upon. The international community should spell out clearly what is expected from Israel whoever is in power. In that way, the Israeli electorate will choose their candidates in function of their experience/inexperience, their charisma or its absence, their social and economic policies and not the degree of their territorial appetite. Israel
should be made to understand that the international will has primacy on the national whim.